Asia Pacific travellers have a 50% higher intention to increase travel spending than those in Europe and the US, cementing the region’s position as the world’s growth engine for travel. According to one study, 88% of global travellers plan to increase or maintain their travel budgets in 2026.

China’s outbound market is the powerhouse. China’s outbound travel in 2026 is projected to exceed 225 million trips, surpassing pre-pandemic levels and marking a transition from recovery to a structurally different phase of growth. Chinese travellers report the highest expected mean spend at **$7,748 per international leisure trip**, followed by Australian travellers at $7,124 and Indian travellers at $5,154. International visitor spending in China rose by 10.5% to $135 billion, exceeding pre-pandemic levels and outperforming the global average growth of 3.2%.

The World Travel and Tourism Council expects China’s travel and tourism sector to grow 7% annually over the next decade, contributing $3.8 trillion to GDP by 2035. China is on track to surpass the US as the world’s leading travel and tourism economy.

Corporate travel is also booming. Business travel expenditure across Asia Pacific is forecast to reach $70.09 billion in 2026, marking a year-on-year increase of 10.9%. The region is expected to contribute more than 40% of total global outbound business travel spending, underlining APAC’s central role in international commerce and aviation growth. China alone is projected to account for $40.8 billion of this spending — 58% of the regional total.

What’s driving this surge? Expanding visa-free access, a stronger yuan, and pent-up demand from Chinese consumers eager to explore the world. MMGY’s survey of 4,000 travellers shows that Chinese and Indian travellers are planning 3.2-3.5 trips annually versus 1.9-2.3 for Australia, Japan, and South Korea. The destinations winning Chinese travellers are those offering premium experiences, seamless digital payments, culturally resonant offerings, and visa facilitation.

The spending differential is significant. Chinese travellers not only travel more frequently but spend substantially more per trip than travellers from other major Asia Pacific markets. This makes them the most coveted segment for destinations worldwide, driving intense competition among tourism boards to attract and retain Chinese visitors through targeted marketing, direct flights, and culturally tailored experiences.

The Indonesian rupiah has weakened 3.6% year-to-date as of late April, making it the second-worst-performing currency in the Asia-Pacific region after the Indian rupee, even as Bank Indonesia has held its benchmark interest rate steady at 4.75% for a seventh consecutive meeting in an effort to defend it, according to McKinsey’s Southeast Asia quarterly economic review.

Growth Is Strong. The Currency Doesn’t Care.

The rupiah’s weakness is especially striking given that Indonesia’s underlying economy is performing well by regional standards. GDP expanded 5.61% in the first quarter of 2026, the fastest pace in more than three years, driven by a surge in government spending and strong household consumption tied to Eid festivities, McKinsey’s analysis found. Foreign direct investment into Indonesia grew for a second consecutive quarter, rising 8.1% to 249.9 trillion rupiah, roughly $14.5 billion, with Singapore remaining the largest source of that investment at $4.6 billion, followed by China, Japan, Hong Kong, and the United States.

That combination, strong growth alongside currency weakness, reflects a familiar emerging-market dynamic: Indonesia’s fundamentals are solid, but its currency remains exposed to global risk sentiment and capital flows that have little to do with domestic performance. Inflation rose to 3.48% by the end of the first quarter, moving closer to the upper bound of Bank Indonesia’s 1.5% to 3.5% target range, marking the fourth consecutive quarter-end increase as the weaker rupiah made imported raw materials more expensive, McKinsey’s report notes.

Bank Indonesia’s Defense Strategy

Faced with this pressure, Bank Indonesia has signaled readiness to step up both onshore and offshore foreign exchange intervention to curb currency weakness and keep inflation within its target range, according to reporting from Edge Malaysia cited in McKinsey’s review. Holding the policy rate steady for seven straight meetings represents a deliberate prioritization of rupiah stability over further monetary stimulus, even as growth data suggests the central bank could otherwise have room to ease.

The strategy carries real costs. Sustained intervention draws down foreign exchange reserves, and if the rupiah’s depreciation trend continues, as it did further into April beyond the 3.6% year-to-date figure, Bank Indonesia may eventually face a choice between more aggressive rate action and accepting a weaker currency alongside higher imported inflation. Regional context offers little comfort: Malaysia’s central bank governor has separately noted that most Southeast Asian currencies, apart from the Chinese renminbi and Singapore dollar, have weakened against the US dollar this year, including the rupiah, Philippine peso, South Korean won, and Thai baht.

De-Dollarization as a Longer-Term Hedge

Indonesia is simultaneously pursuing a structural response to currency vulnerability: reducing its reliance on the US dollar for regional trade altogether. Bank Indonesia officially joined Project Nexus as its sixth participating jurisdiction in February 2026, part of a broader Southeast Asian push toward multilateral digital payment connectivity, according to Travel and Tour World’s coverage of the initiative. Bilateral transaction volumes using local currencies between Indonesia and China surged to a $6.23 billion equivalent from January to July 2025, up sharply from $2.17 billion during the same period the prior year.

The country has also completed a rigorous sandboxing phase for cross-border QRIS-to-Alipay and UnionPay connectivity with the People’s Bank of China, soft-launching the system on June 11, 2026, and separately initiated cross-border QR payment connectivity with the Bank of Korea on April 1. Programs like QRIS SIAP have been deployed across the archipelago to help rural merchants and small businesses adopt these digital payment rails safely, part of a broader financial literacy push accompanying the technical rollout.

What the Iran War Adds to the Equation

Indonesia’s currency and inflation challenges are compounding an existing vulnerability to the global energy shock triggered by the Iran conflict. As a significant energy importer, Indonesia faces the same imported-inflation pressure affecting economies from the UK to Malaysia, but with the added complication of a currency already under depreciation pressure before the conflict began. That combination, a weakening rupiah plus higher global energy costs, creates a more difficult policy environment than either factor would present alone, since currency weakness itself makes imported oil and gas more expensive in local-currency terms, amplifying the direct price effect of the Strait of Hormuz disruption.

The Path Forward

Bank Indonesia’s next moves will likely hinge on two separate but related questions: whether global risk sentiment stabilizes enough to ease pressure on emerging-market currencies broadly, and whether the Iran war’s energy price effects continue moderating as they have through the second quarter. Until then, the central bank appears committed to its current approach, prioritizing currency stability through direct intervention and rate policy while building out longer-term structural alternatives to dollar dependence through regional payment integration, a two-track strategy that reflects Jakarta’s recognition that currency vulnerability cannot be solved through monetary policy alone.

On February 28, 2026, as U.S. and Israeli missiles struck Iran, the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20% of the world’s traded oil passes — effectively closed. It was not a single act but a process: shipping companies rerouted, insurance premiums spiked to prohibitive levels, tankers turned back, and within days, one of the most critical chokepoints in the global economy had become a war zone.

Four months later, the strait is only partially reopened. Data shows about 39 ships crossed through Monday, compared to roughly 100 per day before the war. Eleven thousand seafarers remain stranded. And the entire episode has exposed fundamental limits in American maritime dominance.

The Seafarer Crisis: 11,000 Stranded

The evacuation of more than 11,000 sailors stranded in the Gulf because of the U.S.-Iran war will take “a few weeks,” the head of the International Maritime Organization told AFP. About 600 ships are stuck since the start of the conflict, with the IMO hoping to eventually evacuate “around 50 vessels a day.”

The evacuation is being carried out in close cooperation with Iran, Oman, all other coastal states in the region, the United States, and the maritime industry. Oman has authorized a route along its coastline, south of the historic shipping lanes, to enable safe passage for stranded vessels.

The human cost is striking: thousands of seafarers from dozens of countries — many from South Asia and Southeast Asia — have been trapped in a war zone for months, their ships accumulating debris on hulls, their contracts long expired, their families in the dark.

Brookings: The New Disorder at Sea

Brookings scholars Peter Dombrowski and Bruce Jones have examined the new disorder at sea and the limits of American sea power, as the Iran war exposed critical maritime vulnerabilities.

Their central argument: the United States possesses overwhelming maritime superiority in conventional terms — more aircraft carriers, more destroyers, more submarine capability than any other power. Yet Iran, a sanctioned, economically damaged state, was able to credibly threaten to close the world’s most important oil shipping route for months.

The paradox: military dominance does not automatically translate into maritime security. The ability to sink Iranian warships does not prevent Iran from deploying cheap mines, small-boat swarms, and anti-ship missiles in a confined waterway where geography favors the defender.

Iran’s “Hormuz Safe” Scheme: A Financial Workaround

The Iran war also revealed an unexpected dimension of maritime economic warfare. For Washington, Iran’s “Hormuz Safe” scheme is a dangerous proposition, demonstrating that a sanctioned state can build its own maritime financial infrastructure, bypassing Lloyd’s, the dollar, and U.S. sanctions simultaneously.

This is not merely a tactical innovation. It is a proof-of-concept for how sanctioned states can construct alternative financial architectures for maritime trade — a development with profound implications for U.S. economic statecraft.

The IMEC Corridor: Back to the Drawing Board

The Iran war dealt a severe blow to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), one of the signature infrastructure initiatives of the G7’s counter-Belt-and-Road strategy. The U.S.-backed IMEC corridor had sought to bolster resilience against the weaponization of chokepoints, yet the Iran war closed the very waters the transport corridor relies on — forcing a rethink on future routes.

The irony is complete: a project designed to reduce vulnerability to supply chain disruption was itself disrupted by the very conflict it was meant to hedge against.

The Hull Debris Problem: A Hidden Cost

One of the war’s less reported but economically significant consequences is the physical state of shipping vessels caught in the conflict zone. For months, ships waiting to cross the strait have accumulated hundreds of thousands of square feet worth of debris on their hulls, which now needs to be removed before they can safely resume operation.

This is not a trivial undertaking. Hull cleaning is expensive, time-consuming, and environmentally regulated. The aggregate cost — across hundreds of vessels — represents a hidden tax on the global shipping industry that will take months to fully account for.

The Doctrinal Rethink: What Navy Planners Are Learning

The Iran war has triggered a fundamental reassessment in naval doctrine. Key questions being wrestled with in Pentagon and allied war colleges:

• How do you guarantee freedom of navigation in a confined strait against a sophisticated area-denial adversary without committing to full-scale war?
• What is the right balance between carrier-based power projection and distributed, smaller-vessel maritime presence?
• How do you protect commercial shipping without placing warships in harm’s way for extended periods?
• What role can unmanned vessels, both surface and subsurface, play in maintaining maritime presence without escalation risk?

None of these questions has easy answers. But the 2026 Iran war has made them urgent in a way that no tabletop exercise or war game could replicate.

Conclusion: The Sea is Contested Again

The post-Cold War assumption of American maritime dominance — that the U.S. Navy could guarantee freedom of navigation anywhere on earth — has been fundamentally challenged by the 2026 Iran war. Not disproved. Challenged. The distinction matters.

The United States retains enormous maritime power. But the Iran war demonstrated that power has limits, that geography matters, that cheap asymmetric capabilities can impose enormous costs on conventional forces, and that financial and logistical maritime systems are as vulnerable as military ones.

The world is relearning, at considerable cost, that the sea is contested — and that maritime security must be actively maintained, not assumed.

Tags: Strait of Hormuz 2026, Maritime Security Iran War, US Sea Power Limits, Hormuz Shipping Crisis, Seafarers Stranded Gulf, Maritime Disorder, IMEC Corridor Iran