Democrats now control both chambers, but the president still holds the commanding heights of foreign policy. The change will come in cost and tempo, not direction.

Capitals from Tehran to Tallinn are reading Tuesday’s results as a verdict. Democrats won both houses of Congress. The war in Iran helped drive the result, and Donald Trump himself conceded afterwards that it had played a part in his party’s defeat, even as he defended launching it. Voters had endured eight months of conflict that pushed up petrol prices and dragged down the president’s approval ratings. Election 2026: Democrats capture both chambers of Congress

It is tempting to conclude that American strategy is about to bend. It is not. The election has changed what the president’s choices cost, and he can still make them.

The sole organ

Lawyers like to quote a 1936 Supreme Court opinion calling the president the “sole organ” of the nation in foreign affairs. The line is over-read: the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war and to fund armies, and the court itself later reined in presidential claims in the Youngstown steel-seizure case. But the practical record favours the executive. Sanctions, strikes, deployments, executive orders and the daily management of alliances all sit within the president’s reach, and Congress has rarely found a way to take them back.

The current war shows how little a hostile legislature can do on its own. The House has repeatedly passed resolutions to limit operations against Iran, and the Senate approved its own version in June. A later Senate attempt fell short by a single vote, and a House measure passed 220–204 in September with seven Republicans joining Democrats. None of it has changed the facts on the ground. Mr Trump has shown more than once that he can veto such resolutions or simply ignore them, and Democrats lack the two-thirds majority needed to override a veto. democrats projected win house voters rebuke trumps iran war

Where the pressure bites

The Democrats’ real leverage is the budget. Before the election, senior Democrats promised to cut funding for the Iran war if they won power. Senator Tim Kaine has argued that, with war-powers votes ignored, his party is “pushed back to the appropriations side” and has floated amending the War Powers Act so that funding for unilateral operations lapses automatically after 60 days. This is a blunt tool. Spending bills need bipartisan support in the Senate, and a Congress that is seen to starve troops in the field pays a political price of its own. But the threat alone changes the president’s calculations. Where Democrats Can Thwart Trump’s Foreign Policy

Oversight is the second lever. Committee chairs can investigate how the administration makes foreign-policy decisions even where they cannot reverse them, and subpoenas and televised hearings turn a quiet policy into a daily argument. Personnel is the third: ambassadorships and other nominations give the Senate a way to extract concessions.

The pattern is familiar. Congress cannot command the president, but it can raise the price of every decision he takes. As the commentator Anne Applebaum put it, it can offer a different narrative about the war and about American foreign policy more broadly.

The danger of a cornered president

The counterintuitive risk is that political weakness at home makes unilateral action abroad more tempting. Before the election, Mr Trump hinted several times that hostilities with Iran would resume afterwards, and one analyst argues he was held back by the campaign and no longer is. Another warns that a president who feels cornered may choose to use force unilaterally. A new Congress is not sworn in until January, and Mr Trump says little will change in the lame-duck session. That leaves a window in which the executive faces no new constraint. will democratic control of Congress change Trump’s Middle East policy 3006125

Adversaries will also read the ballot box for weakness. Tehran may conclude that American resolve is eroding. Washington’s task is to pair any diplomatic opening with deterrence that adversaries believe, which is much harder when the opposition party is publicly calling for the war to end.

What will not move

Most of American strategy is untouched by an election. Freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, the commitments in the Indo-Pacific, the nuclear red lines on Iran and the weight of NATO are held in place by forward bases, treaties and a national-security bureaucracy that outlasts any Congress. Allies may feel some renewed confidence in American democracy, but confidence is not policy. Even Democrats who want to rein in the war have not, so far, proposed abandoning the Gulf.

What to watch

Three tests will show whether this is a shift in cost or something larger. The first is the January spending fight, when Democrats must decide whether to use the purse to constrain operations. The second is whether the seven House Republicans who defected in September become a bloc or remain a footnote. The third is the first round of Iran hearings. If witnesses are forced to defend the war under oath, a president who has governed by decree will have to start justifying his choices.

Foreign policy will not pivot. But for the first time in two years, it will have an audience that talks back.

Presidents have always chosen chiefs of staff for loyalty. What Donald Trump has chosen this time is loyalty with a policy agenda attached.

On Friday, days after midterm losses that cost Republicans control of Congress, Trump announced that Stephen Miller will replace Susie Wiles as White House chief of staff, starting Monday. Miller, the architect of the administration’s immigration agenda, is its most ideologically driven senior official. The coverage has mostly read the move as a tightening of the circle and a bet on the base.

That reading is right, but it leaves out something that matters. Miller is one half of a partnership, and the other half deserves more attention than it gets.

The partnership

Katie Miller, his wife, worked as a communications aide to Vice President Mike Pence, was involved with the Department of Government Efficiency, and now builds her own audience through digital media. Washington has long treated spouses as ornaments. The Millers look more like an enterprise: one holds institutional power over policy, and the other holds an independent platform that doesn’t depend on any briefing or the goodwill of any editor.

Nobody outside the couple can say what part her influence played in Trump’s decision, and this column does not claim to know. But it is fair to point out what the arrangement offers a president. The Millers give him a policy operator and a media channel who are, in a political sense, one household.

Why it matters now

A president who has lost Congress will govern mostly through executive action, which means fights over oversight, subpoenas and messaging. In that setting, a chief of staff’s job shifts from brokering deals on Capitol Hill to controlling the story, and the person who controls the story outside the building matters nearly as much as the one controlling the paper flow inside it.

Wiles was valued for discretion. She was the first woman to hold the job, and by most accounts she kept her profile low and her operation disciplined. Miller’s profile is the opposite. His appointment signals that the White House expects to be on offense.

The risks

There is a downside, and an honest account has to include it. Chiefs of staff traditionally serve as the honest brokers who tell presidents what they don’t want to hear. A chief who is also the architect of the agenda has a harder time playing that role. And a communications apparatus that runs through the chief’s own household invites questions about conflicts and accountability that Washington has not had to settle before.

Miller’s defenders will say that loyalty and clarity of purpose are what a second-term president needs after a bruising election. His critics will note that the voters who just delivered those midterm results rendered a verdict on some of the policies he built.

Both arguments deserve a hearing. What neither side should do is pretend that Miller arrives alone. The partnership will shape how this White House governs and speaks, and it should be judged as part of the job.

From Los Angeles to New York and Washington, democratic socialists are winning elections by promising a more affordable urban future. Their greatest challenge may be not defeating the political establishment, but succeeding where it failed.

For decades, democratic socialism in the United States was more often a language of protest than an exercise in executive power. Its advocates organized tenants, challenged corporate influence, protested economic inequality and demanded a greater public role in providing housing, transportation and social services. Winning control of America’s biggest cities, however, remained an ambition more than a governing reality.

That distinction is rapidly disappearing.

On November 5, Los Angeles City Council member Nithya Raman emerged victorious in her challenge to incumbent Mayor Karen Bass, becoming the first person of South Asian descent elected to lead America’s second-largest city. Her victory followed the election of Janeese Lewis George as Washington, D.C.’s next mayor on November 3 and the political breakthrough that brought Zohran Mamdani to New York City Hall in 2025.

Together, these victories suggest that a once-marginal political movement has become an increasingly credible contender for municipal power. Seattle, where democratic socialist Katie Wilson took office in January 2026, offers further evidence of the trend.

But the significance of this political moment lies in something more consequential than the electoral success of four left-wing politicians.

The American left is beginning to inherit the institutions it spent decades criticizing. It must now prove that its ideas can survive the demands of governing.

As Reuters reported following Raman’s victory, the Los Angeles result reflected widespread dissatisfaction with homelessness, housing affordability and the quality of public services. The election was not simply a referendum on socialism. It was a verdict on a municipal establishment that many voters no longer trusted to solve the problems closest to their daily lives.

That difference matters. Voters can embrace a radical promise without endorsing every aspect of the ideology behind it.

And a movement that mistakes public frustration for unlimited political permission risks repeating the failures of the establishment it has displaced.

Los Angeles: The Revolt Against Municipal Incompetence

Nithya Raman’s victory represents one of the most remarkable reversals in contemporary Los Angeles politics.

Only months earlier, Raman had endorsed Karen Bass for reelection. She subsequently entered the contest shortly before the candidate-filing deadline, transforming what might have been a relatively conventional incumbent campaign into an unusually competitive referendum on City Hall.

Bass possessed nearly every institutional advantage associated with political incumbency. Her supporters included California Governor Gavin Newsom, former Vice President Kamala Harris and former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Her political career encompassed leadership in California’s legislature and service in Congress.

Yet those endorsements proved insufficient to overcome public dissatisfaction.

The Los Angeles Times reported on November 5 that Bass conceded after the vote count established Raman’s winning lead. Raman became the first challenger to defeat an incumbent Los Angeles mayor in more than two decades.

The Los Angeles County election returns remained unofficial as counting continued, making it premature to treat any interim percentage as the certified final margin.

Bass’s political difficulties had multiple causes. Los Angeles remained burdened by an immense homelessness crisis, persistent housing shortages and deteriorating public infrastructure. Her administration also faced criticism surrounding the response to the devastating January 2025 Southern California wildfires.

Raman’s campaign converted those frustrations into a broader argument: Los Angeles was not suffering solely from insufficient resources or political ambition. Its government had become too slow, fragmented and unresponsive to deliver improvements at the scale residents needed.

Her biography reinforced that message. An immigrant from India who studied at Harvard and MIT, Raman entered politics through urban planning and homelessness advocacy rather than a traditional party hierarchy. In 2020, she defeated incumbent Council member David Ryu, establishing herself as a representative of grassroots progressive organizing.

Her central promise was not merely redistribution. It was institutional transformation.

According to her campaign’s housing platform, Raman proposed tripling annual housing construction, reducing bureaucratic obstacles and expanding development across market-rate, subsidized and social housing.

That platform reveals an ideological complication often overlooked in national discussions of democratic socialism.

Raman is willing to challenge some regulatory and political assumptions traditionally associated with the urban left.

She has argued that excessive permitting delays, restrictive land-use rules and resistance to new development have helped make Los Angeles unaffordable. In a revealing break with some progressive allies, she supported efforts to reconsider aspects of the city’s so-called mansion tax when she believed they were discouraging apartment construction.

As LAist’s examination of the candidates’ housing policies explained, Raman differed from Bass on key questions about housing density near public transportation and restrictions on new residential development.

She is therefore not easily categorized as a conventional anti-market socialist.

Her political proposition is more complicated: government should protect vulnerable residents, but it must also allow enough housing to be built for the city to remain economically viable.

That combination may prove electorally powerful. Whether it can survive confrontation with neighborhood opposition, established interest groups and the realities of municipal finance is another question.

A Socialist Wave — But Not a Single Ideology

The rise of Raman, Mamdani and Lewis George invites comparisons, but treating them as politically interchangeable would obscure the more interesting story.

New York, Los Angeles and Washington have elected leaders with overlapping commitments to affordability, tenant rights and stronger public institutions. Yet their governing philosophies, institutional constraints and political constituencies differ substantially.

Mamdani entered office in January 2026 with promises to make New York more affordable through expanded child care, rent stabilisation and stronger public investment.

His administration has already produced measurable policy changes.

In June, New York’s Rent Guidelines Board adopted a freeze on permitted increases for covered rent-stabilized leases beginning October 1. The decision represented a significant political victory for tenants, although its longer-term effects on building maintenance and rental investment remain contested.

In August, the administration announced the elimination of remaining out-of-pocket child-care fees for approximately 22,000 eligible families already receiving subsidised care. This was a concrete expansion of affordability, not the completion of universal child care.

The distinction is essential. Municipal progress should be measured by policies implemented and services delivered, not by the scale of campaign promises.

Mamdani has also advanced a housing strategy targeting 200,000 new affordable homes over a decade. The proposal recognises that redistribution alone cannot resolve a housing crisis if supply remains chronically insufficient.

Washington presents a different political experiment.

Lewis George, a former prosecutor and council member, campaigned on affordable child care, tenant protections, stronger worker rights and the creation of 72,000 housing units.

Her victory was decisive, but her coming administration faces financial constraints that cannot be overcome through political enthusiasm alone.

As The Washington Post reported, Lewis George will inherit a capital confronting severe fiscal pressures, economic disruption linked to federal employment cuts and a complicated relationship with the federal government.

Unlike New York or Los Angeles, Washington operates under the District of Columbia’s distinctive home-rule system, leaving it vulnerable to forms of federal intervention that other municipal governments do not face.

The diversity of these circumstances undermines the suggestion that a unified socialist model is sweeping effortlessly across America.

What is emerging instead is a family of political experiments, united by dissatisfaction with the status quo but divided over methods, priorities and acceptable compromises.

Even Raman’s relationship with the Democratic Socialists of America has been complicated. As The Washington Post documented before the election, disputes over Israel, development policy and political independence created friction between Raman and sections of the movement.

Such tensions are not necessarily evidence of weakness.

They may be the unavoidable consequence of transitioning from ideological solidarity to the compromises required for governing a diverse city.

The Housing Contradiction at the Heart of the New Left

If there is one issue capable of determining the future of America’s municipal left, it is housing.

Housing has become the principal mechanism through which urban inequality reproduces itself. High rents undermine wage gains, restrict mobility, push young families away from employment centers and deepen social divisions.

The problem is national in scale.

Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies found in its 2026 State of the Nation’s Housing report that affordability pressures remained severe, with record levels of renter cost burdens and a continued shortage of homes affordable to lower-income households.

For years, progressive housing policy has emphasized rent protections, subsidies and public investment. Those measures can provide essential relief, particularly for people already living close to financial insecurity.

But they also raise a difficult question: Can cities protect existing tenants while simultaneously creating enough homes for future residents?

Rent stabilization without construction risks preserving scarcity. Construction without tenant protections can expose vulnerable communities to displacement. Subsidies without fiscal discipline can become increasingly expensive while leaving underlying shortages intact.

A durable housing strategy therefore requires more than one familiar ideological answer.

It requires reforming zoning and approval systems, expanding publicly supported housing, protecting tenants against arbitrary displacement, and finding workable partnerships with nonprofit and private developers.

Raman’s Los Angeles platform is especially revealing because it attempts to reconcile these often-competing priorities.

Her approach challenges both the idea that unrestricted property development will automatically generate affordability and the opposing assumption that stronger regulation alone can solve structural housing shortages.

Mamdani faces a similar challenge in New York, where the protection of rent-stabilized households must coexist with incentives to maintain existing buildings and increase supply.

Lewis George confronts it in Washington, where ambitious housing targets depend on investment in a city facing economic uncertainty.

For all three, the central question is whether affordability can become a measurable governing outcome rather than a permanent campaign slogan.

The Fiscal Reality That Campaigns Cannot Escape

There is a fundamental difference between promising that government will do more and proving that government can deliver more effectively.

The mayors emerging from the democratic socialist movement will confront that distinction almost immediately.

New York City adopted a fiscal 2027 budget of approximately $125.8 billion. Yet the city comptroller’s August assessment warned that unresolved structural fiscal pressures remained beneath the balanced annual budget.

Washington faces a different but equally demanding fiscal challenge. September 2026 revenue estimates projected weaker revenue in subsequent fiscal years, reflecting the economic effects of federal job losses.

Los Angeles has its own administrative problem: how to convert public appropriations into working programs.

The Los Angeles Times reported that the city underspent its homelessness budget by at least $473 million during fiscal 2025–26, with bureaucratic fragmentation, staffing shortages and delays among the contributing factors.

That failure illustrates a problem money alone cannot solve.

A city may commit substantial resources to homelessness while lacking the administrative systems needed to deploy them effectively. Agencies may work at cross-purposes. Contractors may be inadequately supervised. Housing projects may spend years navigating approvals. Residents may experience the resulting failures as evidence that government itself is incapable of improvement.

For a movement advocating a larger public role in social provision, administrative dysfunction carries a particular political danger.

If democratic socialists demand expanded government responsibility but cannot improve institutional capacity, their opponents will have a powerful argument against further expansion.

The practical test, therefore, is not simply how much money these administrations allocate to housing, transit or child care.

It is whether the money produces measurable improvements at sustainable cost.

That means transparent procurement, independent auditing, rigorous program evaluation and a willingness to discontinue initiatives that fail.

It also means acknowledging something difficult for any ideological movement: efficient administration is not a concession to centrism. It is a prerequisite for delivering progressive policy.

The Trump Factor: Resistance Meets Responsibility

The resurgence of democratic socialist municipal leadership is unfolding during Donald Trump’s second presidency, adding a national dimension to what would otherwise be local elections.

Immigration enforcement, federal funding, public safety and the boundaries of municipal authority have become central points of conflict between cities and Washington.

Raman campaigned on replacing Los Angeles Police Chief Jim McDonnell, criticizing what she regarded as inadequate separation between local policing and federal immigration enforcement.

Lewis George has similarly promised to end cooperation between Washington’s local police and federal immigration authorities in implementing the administration’s deportation agenda, according to The Washington Post’s election reporting.

These positions may reinforce support among voters worried about aggressive immigration enforcement. But mayoral resistance operates within legal and constitutional limits.

Cities cannot simply nullify federal law. They can, however, make decisions within the boundaries of their lawful authority about local resources, enforcement priorities and the protections available to residents.

That creates a delicate governing challenge.

The new mayors must defend their political commitments without allowing permanent confrontation with Washington to displace the basic obligations of municipal administration.

Mamdani’s experience suggests that ideological confrontation and practical negotiation need not be mutually exclusive. His administration has pursued progressive economic goals while also developing a less confrontational relationship with Trump than many anticipated.

For Raman, the challenge may be even more immediate.

Los Angeles is preparing to host the 2028 Olympic Games, a massive undertaking requiring coordination across multiple levels of government, extensive security planning and the management of substantial public expectations.

For Lewis George, the federal relationship is unavoidable by geography and law.

The political lesson is clear: resistance may help win an election, but governing requires knowing when to confront, when to negotiate and when to pursue incremental gains.

Beyond the Socialist Label: What Did Voters Actually Demand?

It would be tempting to interpret these electoral victories as evidence that millions of urban Americans have embraced democratic socialism as a comprehensive economic ideology.

That conclusion would go further than the available evidence supports.

The victories of Raman, Mamdani, Lewis George and Wilson demonstrate growing electoral receptiveness to candidates associated with democratic socialism. They do not establish that every voter who supported them endorses the movement’s broader ideological program.

Urban coalitions are rarely so uniform.

Some voters are committed socialists. Others are younger renters exhausted by housing costs. Some are labor organizers or immigrant-rights advocates. Others may be small-business owners frustrated by dysfunctional permitting, public disorder or municipal inefficiency.

Still others simply believe the incumbent establishment has had enough time to prove itself.

Raman’s campaign illustrates this political diversity particularly well. Her supporters included grassroots progressives, housing-development advocates and voters attracted to her promises of administrative reform.

Her success was not achieved by persuading every Angeleno to adopt the same political identity.

It came from assembling a coalition around practical grievances and the possibility of improvement.

That distinction should encourage the movement’s leaders to govern with intellectual flexibility rather than ideological triumphalism.

A successful administration will need to recognize when a market-based solution advances public welfare, when regulation is necessary and when direct public investment is indispensable.

It will also have to take opposition seriously. Residents concerned about taxes, public safety, development pressures or service quality are not necessarily enemies of social progress.

Democratic legitimacy requires answering their concerns, not dismissing them.

The more durable realignment may therefore be less a victory for socialism as doctrine than a transformation in what Americans expect from local government.

Cities are increasingly judged by whether ordinary people can afford to remain in them and whether public institutions can perform the functions for which residents pay taxes.

That demand can reward progressive candidates today. It can just as easily turn against them tomorrow.

The Real Revolution Begins After Election Night

The municipal left has reached a threshold that previous generations of American socialists could scarcely have imagined.

Its candidates have won some of the country’s most visible executive offices. They command substantial political attention, mobilize enthusiastic supporters and have an opportunity to demonstrate alternatives to conventional urban governance.

Yet the next phase of their political development will be less glamorous and far more consequential.

Raman will be judged by whether Los Angeles builds more homes, reduces street homelessness, restores confidence in city services and manages the Olympic preparations responsibly.

Mamdani will be judged by whether New Yorkers experience lasting affordability gains without a deterioration in housing quality, municipal services or financial stability.

Lewis George will be judged by whether Washington can expand opportunity while restoring economic confidence and protecting the city’s limited autonomy.

Wilson faces comparable pressures in Seattle.

None can permanently govern as an insurgent. Once elected, they become responsible for the institutions they once criticized.

This is the paradox of the municipal left’s success: winning power deprives it of the luxury of explaining every failure as somebody else’s responsibility.

America’s democratic socialists have demonstrated that they can organize, persuade and win elections. They have not yet demonstrated, across these cities and over a sustained period, that they can translate those victories into a superior model of urban government.

That is not a reason to dismiss their achievement. It is a reason to take it seriously.

The future of this movement will not be decided by the number of socialist mayors elected, the intensity of their campaign rhetoric or the enthusiasm of their supporters.

It will be decided in permitting offices, housing developments, school systems, budget negotiations, public-safety decisions and the ordinary encounters between citizens and city government.

The American left has won the right to govern. Its next task is to prove that it can make government work.

And that may be the most consequential political experiment now unfolding in America’s cities.