Iran’s tenacious regime and the future of the Gulf hangs in the balance as Mojtaba Khamenei vows Hormuz closure, oil tops $100, and Gulf states face an impossible choice.

When the first B-2 bombers arced over the Persian Gulf in the predawn hours of February 28, 2026, the assumption in Washington and Jerusalem was brutally simple: decapitate the regime, and the Islamic Republic would shudder into transition. Thirteen days later, that assumption lies in ruins — and the question that now preoccupies chancelleries from Riyadh to Brussels, from Doha to Tokyo, is the same one that has humbled strategists for four decades. Iran’s tenacious regime and the future of the Gulf have once again become the defining geopolitical problem of our era, more urgent and more dangerous than at any moment since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini seized power in 1979.

On February 28, 2026, Israel and the United States launched surprise airstrikes on multiple sites and cities across Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and numerous other Iranian officials, triggering a war. Wikipedia What followed was not the popular uprising that Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump had publicly forecast. It was a ferocious, structured retaliation that struck civilian airports in Dubai, sent plumes of black smoke rising over Doha’s industrial district, hit the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain’s Manama, and forced Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Bahrain to temporarily close their airspace. Al Jazeera The Strait of Hormuz — the 21-mile chokepoint through which roughly a fifth of the world’s daily oil consumption flows — effectively ground to a halt, with tanker traffic dropping first by approximately 70 percent before collapsing to near zero, leaving over 150 ships anchored outside the strait. Wikipedia

Oil prices surged past $100 per barrel CNBC and briefly touched $120, their highest level since the COVID-19 pandemic. And on March 9, in a move that extinguished any lingering hope of rapid regime collapse, Iran’s Assembly of Experts elected Mojtaba Khamenei, the 56-year-old son of the slain supreme leader, as the Islamic Republic’s third supreme leader since its founding in 1979. NPR Then, on March 12, in his first public statement since succeeding his father, Mojtaba Khamenei defied President Trump’s warnings and vowed to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, calling its blockade a lever of pressure that “must continue to be used.” Time

The regime did not fall. It metastasised.

A Revolution Built to Survive Its Founder

To understand why Iran’s resilience confounds outsiders so consistently, one must begin not with missiles but with institutional architecture. The Islamic Republic was designed — with unusual intentionality — as a system that could outlast any individual, including the supreme leader himself.

Over the course of nearly 37 years in power, Khamenei cemented the unique dominance of his office, thwarted every effort to make meaningful changes to Iran’s approach to the world, and empowered and expanded its influence across the region. Brookings Yet the very networks he cultivated — the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the bonyads (religious foundations controlling an estimated third of the Iranian economy), the clerical establishment embedded in the judiciary, education and media — were never merely instruments of Khamenei personally. They were the regime itself, a deep state so thoroughly interwoven with the fabric of Iranian governance that decapitating its leadership was always unlikely to precipitate institutional collapse.

Just as the shah’s departure failed to usher in the aspirations of the millions who rallied in the streets during the 1979 revolution, it remains highly uncertain that the U.S.-Israeli operation will successfully produce a real transition to a different kind of governance. Brookings The analogy is instructive: in both 1979 and 2026, the removal of a supreme authority generated not a power vacuum but a succession contest the regime’s hardliners were structurally positioned to win.

The Battlefield as of March 13, 2026

Operation Epic Fury, as Washington has named its campaign, has now entered its thirteenth day with no discernible exit strategy articulated by either the United States or Israel. By March 5, Iran had fired over 500 ballistic and naval missiles and almost 2,000 drones since February 28 — roughly 40 percent aimed at Israel and 60 percent toward US targets across the region. Wikipedia

The rate of ballistic missile launches declined in the opening days of the war, with analysts pointing to depletion of Iranian missile and launcher stores as well as a deliberate strategy of rationing for a longer war. Wikipedia This is a critical distinction. Iran is not firing recklessly. It is managing escalation with strategic patience — an insight that should discomfort those who framed this operation as a short, decisive strike.

The internal dynamics within Tehran also reveal a regime in tension but not in freefall. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized to neighboring Gulf states for the strikes and ordered the armed forces to stop, but the Revolutionary Guards continued with the attacks — exposing a leadership rift within the Iranian government. Wikipedia That the IRGC could visibly defy a presidential order and face no immediate sanction is not a sign of chaos. It is a sign of where real authority resides.

On March 10, US military intelligence sources reported that Iran had begun planting naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz. Trump demanded their immediate removal, and the US military said it destroyed 16 Iranian minelayers. Wikipedia The mining of the strait represents a qualitative escalation: it transforms a temporary traffic disruption into a structural threat to global energy security that cannot be resolved by a single air campaign.

Why Iran’s Regime Remains Tenacious: The IRGC, Succession, and Popular Legitimacy

The IRGC as the Regime’s Immune System

No analysis of Iran’s resilience is complete without accounting for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, an entity that functions simultaneously as a military force, an intelligence apparatus, a vast commercial empire, and the ideological vanguard of the revolution. The IRGC boasts expansive intelligence capabilities, business networks, and nearly 200,000 personnel. CNBC It has its own navy, air force, missile command, and — critically — its own succession logic that runs parallel to the formal constitutional process.

When Ali Khamenei was killed, Iran International stated that IRGC commanders tried to appoint a new supreme leader quickly, bypassing the formal electoral process, and then pressured Assembly of Experts members to vote for Mojtaba Khamenei with “repeated contacts and psychological and political pressure.” Wikipedia The IRGC did not panic. It organised. Within 72 hours of the supreme leader’s assassination, the institution responsible for Iran’s military posture was already managing the succession — a demonstration of institutional continuity that no airstrike can replicate.

The Mojtaba Question: Continuity in Harder Packaging

Mojtaba Khamenei is more connected to the Islamic Republic’s political and security establishments than his father was. He joined the IRGC in the late 1980s, serving in the final years of the Iran-Iraq war — a period that shaped his ties to Iran’s security elite. CNBC He was identified by US diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks as his father’s “principal gatekeeper” and “the power behind the robes.” He has been linked to the brutal crackdown on the 2009 Green Movement. He is not a reformer who entered the supreme leadership reluctantly. He is a hardliner who spent decades preparing for exactly this moment.

Iran’s election of Mojtaba Khamenei signaled to the world that Tehran would not back down in the war raging across the Middle East Bloomberg — a message received with alarm in every Gulf capital and with market efficiency by crude oil traders. Trump called the appointment “unacceptable.” Former Israeli Ambassador Michael Herzog told CNBC: “The Iranians are showing defiance by choosing the son of Khamenei.” CNBC

That defiance is not irrational. Iran’s tenacious regime has long understood that capitulation is extinction. For the IRGC, for the senior clergy, for the bonyad networks whose wealth depends on the continuation of the current order, accepting regime change is not a policy option. It is existential surrender.

The Legitimacy Paradox: Celebration and Resistance Coexist

As Khamenei’s death was confirmed, many Iranian civilians went out to celebrate in the streets. Elsewhere in Iran, thousands gathered in mourning, and pro-Iranian protests occurred in multiple countries. Wikipedia This is not contradiction — it is the lived complexity of a society where the regime commands neither universal love nor universal loathing. The protests in January 2026 were the largest since the revolution, and the regime killed thousands to suppress them. Yet an institutional structure capable of killing thousands to suppress dissent is, by definition, still a functioning institutional structure.

Airstrikes have powerfully degraded Iran’s military capabilities and decapitated key political and military leadership. Still, the deeply embedded networks and institutions that have underpinned the Islamic Republic for nearly half a century ensure that, at least in the near term, the vestiges of the power structure will persist. Brookings The Islamic Republic was never a dictatorship of one man’s personality. It was — and remains — a system.

The Gulf in the Crossfire: A Security Architecture in Crisis

The Nightmare Scenario Arrives

For years, Gulf analysts spoke of a nightmare scenario in abstract terms: Iranian missiles raining down on civilian infrastructure, energy facilities ablaze, the Strait of Hormuz sealed, and Western military bases serving simultaneously as deterrent shields and target-generating liabilities. On March 1, 2026, the nightmare became a live news broadcast.

In the early days of the war, Iran fired more than twice as many ballistic missiles and approximately 20 times more drones at Gulf states than at Israel. Three people were killed and 78 injured in the UAE alone; Saudi Arabia’s largest refinery was set ablaze; major airports were targeted; and Qatar’s Ras Laffan, a pillar of global LNG supply, was struck. Al Jazeera

The “real nightmare scenario” — as one analyst framed it — is strikes on power grids, water desalination plants and energy infrastructure. “Without air conditioning and water desalination, the scorching hot and bone-dry Gulf countries are essentially uninhabitable,” the analysis noted. “Without energy infrastructure, they’re unprofitable.” Al Jazeera

Saudi Arabia: Opportunity and Exposure

Saudi Arabia’s position is the most paradoxical in the Gulf. Riyadh arguably stands to benefit most from a weakened Iran. Saudi Arabia has long sought to become the dominant power in the Middle East, and Iran has consistently posed the greatest threat to that goal. Iran may have calculated that Saudi Arabia was the most likely of the Gulf countries to respond militarily, and so refrained from major attacks against Riyadh until it decided to escalate against the Gulf on March 2. Atlantic Council

That calculation proved costly for Tehran. The Saudi Foreign Ministry issued a statement of categorical condemnation, calling Iranian attacks “reprehensible” and asserting that they came “despite statements from the Kingdom confirming it would not allow its airspace and territory to be used to target Iran.” Al Jazeera Riyadh’s Shaybah oilfield — one of the world’s largest — was targeted by drones, four of which were intercepted. The Ras Tanura refinery sustained damage visible in satellite imagery. The 2019 Abqaiq strikes, which briefly cut Saudi output by half, now look like a rehearsal.

The UAE: Most Targeted, Most Exposed

The United Arab Emirates bore the brunt of Iran’s Gulf offensive — a targeting logic that remains partially opaque but likely reflects the UAE’s role as both a major US military host (Al Dhafra Air Base) and the regional financial hub that Tehran has long accused of enabling sanctions-busting for the West. The overwhelming Iranian assault on the UAE is one of the most noteworthy elements of the initial Iranian response. Atlantic Council Abu Dhabi and Dubai — cities whose entire economic model rests on perceptions of absolute safety — absorbed strikes that set fire to buildings on Palm Jumeirah, damaged infrastructure near the port of Jebel Ali, and forced schools and universities to switch to remote learning.

The damage to the UAE’s brand of invulnerability is harder to price than the physical destruction.

Qatar: A Trust Destroyed

Qatar’s case is perhaps the most tragic in diplomatic terms. Doha had maintained more open channels to Tehran than any other Gulf state, hosting Hamas negotiations, shuttling between Iranian and Western interlocutors, and repeatedly assuring Tehran that its territory — including the largest US military base in the Middle East, Al Udeid — would not be used offensively against Iran. Qatar issued what officials described as the strongest condemnation in the country’s history, calling the strikes “reckless and irresponsible.” Al Jazeera Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman described the attacks as “a big sense of betrayal” Al Jazeera — language of surprising emotional intensity from one of the Gulf’s most diplomatically reserved leaders.

On March 6, Qatar’s energy minister Saad al-Kaabi warned that if the war continues, other Gulf energy producers may be forced to halt exports and declare force majeure — an announcement he said “will bring down economies of the world.” Wikipedia Qatar had already stopped gas production on March 2 and declared force majeure on gas contracts on March 4. Given that Qatar supplies roughly 16 percent of the world’s LNG, this is not hyperbole. It is arithmetic.

Bahrain and Kuwait: Sovereign Exposure Without Strategic Depth

Bahrain hosts the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet — an arrangement that has historically been framed as deterrence. On February 28, Iranian missiles targeted that headquarters directly. Bahrain’s state-owned energy company Bapco declared force majeure after Iranian strikes targeted its energy installations. Al Jazeera A country of 1.5 million people, sitting 20 kilometres from the Saudi coast, hosting a superpower’s naval command — and receiving no protection it did not provide for itself. The strategic fiction of Gulf states as protected clients rather than exposed frontline states has been definitively shattered.

Kuwait’s position is equally acute. The United States embassy in Kuwait was hit by an Iranian missile strike, prompting Secretary of State Rubio to close the embassy until further notice. Wikipedia A Kuwaiti F/A-18 shot down three American F-15Es in a friendly fire incident on March 2 — a single, accidental image that captures the chaotic geometry of this conflict with cruel precision.

Oman: The Last Bridge

Alone among GCC states, Oman has not been targeted. An Al Jazeera correspondent in Doha noted that Oman was the only GCC member not struck in the initial Iranian salvos. Al Jazeera This is almost certainly deliberate. Muscat has functioned for decades as the Gulf’s backchannel to Tehran — it hosted the secret negotiations that produced the 2015 JCPOA framework. Preserving Oman as an interlocutor is one of the few signals from Tehran that a diplomatic off-ramp, however distant, has not been entirely foreclosed.

Three Scenarios for 2026–2030: Iran’s Regime, the Gulf, and Global Energy

Scenario One: Prolonged Attrition — “The Frozen Conflict”

The most probable near-term trajectory: neither side achieves its stated objectives. The United States degrades Iran’s military infrastructure without dislodging the IRGC’s command structure or manufacturing a popular uprising. Mojtaba Khamenei consolidates power under wartime emergency conditions, using the conflict as pretext to eliminate moderate voices and cement IRGC supremacy. The Strait of Hormuz reopens partially under international pressure and IEA reserve releases, but remains subject to episodic harassment — mining, drone strikes on tankers, navigation warnings — for months.

The Gulf states face a prolonged security burden they cannot sustain indefinitely. Saudi Arabia and the UAE accelerate their pipeline bypass infrastructure — the Petroline to Yanbu and the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline — but the capacity deficit of approximately 12 million barrels per day cannot be overcome by existing alternative routes, and the Red Sea alternative remains vulnerable to Houthi attacks. Wikipedia Oil stabilises between $90 and $110, injecting sustained inflationary pressure into every import-dependent economy from Karachi to Cape Town. Gulf sovereign wealth funds, flush with windfall revenues, simultaneously fund reconstruction at home while accelerating diversification away from energy dependency — compressing a decade of Vision 2030 ambitions into four years of crisis-driven urgency.

Policy implication: Washington must negotiate a durable Hormuz security framework with Gulf partners and international naval guarantors, including France and India, before any ceasefire — or find itself drawn back within 18 months.

Scenario Two: Accelerated Collapse — “The Velvet Implosion”

A less probable but non-trivial scenario: internal pressure within Iran reaches a tipping point. The January 2026 massacre of protesters, the humiliation of the IRGC’s defensive failures (hundreds of drones and missiles intercepted, nuclear sites destroyed), hyperinflation accelerated by the wartime dollar shortage engineered by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and the symbolic delegitimisation of a hereditary succession (which opposition leader Maryam Rajavi has called “clerical rule turned into hereditary monarchy”) combine to fracture the regime’s internal coalition.

In this scenario, factional conflict within the IRGC — between those who believe the war can be managed and those who see it as existential — produces a leadership crisis that Mojtaba Khamenei, new to office and lacking his father’s 37-year institutional authority, cannot contain. A negotiated transition involving Western interlocutors and internal reformers emerges, facilitated through Oman and possibly Beijing.

Policy implication: Western powers should maintain robust non-military channels and immediately signal their willingness to engage any successor government that renounces nuclear weapons development — without preconditions of regime type that only entrench IRGC hardliners.

Scenario Three: Regional Escalation — “The Gulf War of Choice”

The most dangerous scenario: Iran successfully pressures Gulf states to expel US military bases, either through sustained missile campaigns that make the political cost of hosting American forces untenable, or through a credible threat to permanently mine the Hormuz approaches unless GCC governments force Washington’s hand. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, facing an impossible choice between their security treaty with the United States and the continued habitability of their territories, begin quiet negotiations with Tehran.

Qatar’s energy minister’s warning that 33 percent of global oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz captures the systemic stakes. Al Jazeera If Iran succeeds in making Gulf governments choose between Washington and Tehran, the post-1991 American security architecture in the Gulf — built on the premise that bases are assets, not liabilities — collapses entirely. China, which has invested heavily in Iranian infrastructure under the 2021 25-year cooperation agreement and has voiced steadfast support for Tehran’s sovereignty throughout the crisis, would be the principal beneficiary of any reduction in the American military footprint.

Policy implication: The United States must offer Gulf states a genuine restructuring of the security relationship — not merely renewed defence pledges, but a fundamental rethinking of base posture, burden-sharing arrangements, and the political compact that makes hosting American forces a net benefit rather than a net liability.

Conclusion: What the Tenacious Regime Demands of Policymakers

The lesson of thirteen days of warfare in the Persian Gulf is not that military power is useless — Operation Epic Fury has demonstrably degraded Iran’s nuclear programme, killed its most senior leadership, and imposed severe military costs. The lesson is rather that military power alone cannot resolve the structural conditions that produce regimes like Iran’s Islamic Republic: a revolutionary ideology institutionalised across four decades of state-building, a security apparatus that is simultaneously the regime’s protector and its largest economic stakeholder, and a geopolitical position — astride the world’s most critical energy chokepoint — that gives Tehran leverage no airstrike can permanently neutralise.

For Gulf states, the immediate priority is simultaneously defensive and diplomatic: rebuild air defence architectures that do not depend on American umbrella coverage alone, diversify energy export routes that can operate independently of the Strait, and — critically — preserve the diplomatic channels to Tehran that only Oman and, to some extent, Qatar still maintain. Iran’s attacks on the Gulf constitute a profound moral and legal failure that risks poisoning relations for generations. Al Jazeera But the Gulf states’ own long-term interests demand that they not allow that poisoning to foreclose the eventual return to managed coexistence that their geographic proximity to Iran makes unavoidable.

For Western policymakers, the hardest reckoning is this: wars rarely go according to plan, and in launching a war of choice with Iran, the United States and Israel have unleashed a confrontation that is unlikely to succeed and certain to produce unintended effects they will be unable to manage or contain. Brookings Iran’s tenacious regime did not survive 47 years of sanctions, isolation, internal revolt, and now decapitation by accident. It survived because it was designed to survive, because its institutions have roots that run deeper than any individual leader, and because the Persian Gulf’s geography gives it a form of deterrence that no amount of bombing can eliminate.

The question for 2026 and beyond is not whether the Islamic Republic will persist in some form — it will. The question is what form it will take, whether a Mojtaba-IRGC condominium moves Iran toward greater nuclear ambition or strategic exhaustion, and whether the Gulf states that stand in the crossfire between American power and Iranian defiance will emerge from this crisis with their sovereignty intact, their economies diversified, and their diplomatic relationships durable enough for the decades ahead.

History suggests that the regimes most transformed by external military pressure are those transformed from within — and that the conditions for internal transformation in Iran, including economic desperation, demographic youth pressure, and the delegitimising spectacle of a dynastic succession, are more advanced today than at any point since 1979.

The Islamic Republic is wounded. It is not defeated. And the gulf — in every sense of that word — between those two conditions is where the most consequential geopolitics of our time will be decided.