News
Turkey in the Black Sea Region: Risks for Russia?
On February 3, 2022, President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan made an official visit to Ukraine, during which he managed to put his signature to a Turkey–Ukraine free trade agreement following more than ten years of negotiations on the provisions of the document. But this was not the only achievement of the President’s visit: Ankara and Kiev also signed a framework document on the construction of a facility that will produce Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles in Ukraine.
The dynamically developing relations between Ankara and Kiev bring into focus such issues as Turkey’s vigorous penetration into the post-Soviet space, its willingness to act as a military and political patron of a number of former Soviet countries and aid them in strengthening their relations with NATO despite their non-NATO member status. Do these developments make conflict in the Black Sea more likely? What risks would this create for Russia and its interests?
The Caucasus and Ukraine: Two Links in the Same Chain
After the Second Karabakh War, the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict was no longer a predominantly regional ethnopolitical confrontation rooted in the consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The strategic link between Ankara and Baku formed in the early 1990s has gone from strength to strength. Opportunities for Turkey and Azerbaijan to collectively exert pressure on Armenia (military, political and diplomatic) and Georgia (in terms of economic cooperation) have expanded. Russia’s hegemony in the South Caucasus has been challenged. At the same time, the Turkish strategy of strengthening its positions in Eurasia has created additional tensions in Ankara’s relations with its NATO allies and with Iran.
However, the events of 2020 did not lead to changes in just one region of the post-Soviet space. Turkey’s growing presence in the South Caucasus has opened up opportunities for it to build up political and economic influence in the Black Sea. And the expansion of multifaceted cooperation with Ukraine is one of the most obvious consequences of Turkey’s encroachment into the former Soviet Union.
Today, President Erdogan consistently promotes the idea of Turkey being a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. Yet, he is just as consistent in promoting ideas and practices that are unacceptable to Moscow. Erdogan has made no secret of the fact that he does not recognize Russian jurisdiction over Crimea, while the Russian authorities have declared that the issue of the status of the peninsula is “closed.”
Military-technical cooperation between Ankara and Kiev has long ceased to be merely a part of the foreign policy activity of the two states. On September 29, 2021, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the Bayraktar Savunma signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on the construction of a joint training and testing centre for the maintenance, repair and modernization of UAVs and training of personnel. In late October 2021, Ukraine used a Bayraktar strike drone for the first time in the armed conflict in the southeast of the country, in violation of the peace agreement between the parties. Following the strike, a group of reconnaissance officers from the Armed Forces of Ukraine infiltrated and captured the village of Staromaryevka located in the so-called “grey zone” between the DPR (the unrecognized Donetsk People’s Republic) and Ukraine. Such operations are very much to the liking of Ukraine’s partner countries in Eastern Europe. In the autumn of 2021, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Latvia Artis Pabriks suggested that EU and NATO countries follow Ankara’s example and learn from its experience in developing relations with Kiev without taking the position of Moscow into consideration.
In this context, it is worth noting a certain incongruence between the approaches of the United States and Turkey’s other NATO allies to its actions in the Caucasus and Ukraine. France could not (and cannot) tolerate Ankara’s unequivocal support for Baku, while the United States has adopted a position of cautious restraint. Washington and Paris are co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, and they are concerned about Turkey’s “revisionism” in the Caucasus. This explains why both the French and the American sides are prepared to put up with Russia being the only major player in Nagorno-Karabakh as an inevitability or a lesser evil.
There is an Armenian lobby in the United States and France. Without exaggerating the role that it plays in the politics of both countries, we can say that the issues of Karabakh independence and the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire are present in the American and French narratives. Yet there is no scenario in which one could possibly imagine a discussion of the self-determination of the Donbass republics taking place in Congress or the National Assembly of France. It is unlikely that influential groups (not individual members of parliaments) calling for the recognition of Crimea as part of Russia will appear in either country any time soon.
Thus, the collective West sees Turkey’s advances in Ukraine as being far less nuanced than the strengthening of the strategic alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Some countries of the “New Europe” even believe that Ankara is acting as any NATO member can (and should) act in its relations with Ukraine—without any kind of political correctness or reservations, something that representatives of Germany, France, Italy, Hungary and other EU countries resort to from time to time. All this cannot but embolden Turkey to take new steps to build allied relations with Kiev. In turn, Ukraine, tired of sitting on its hands waiting for NATO to make up its mind about the country’s membership in the organization, is ready to welcome Turkey with open arms.
But does Turkey’s growing activity in the Black Sea necessarily mean that its relations with Russia will suffer greatly? Well, the answer to this question is not as clear-cut as it may seem at first. To understand why this is the case, it is vital to examine the foundations on which the bilateral partnership between Ukraine and Turkey was built.
Ukraine and Turkey: It is more than just about Crimea
For Ukraine, President Erdogan and the Turkish establishment are a sympathetic audience, especially when it comes to the loss of Kiev’s sovereignty over Crimea. Turkish officials miss no opportunity to stress that they do not recognize Russian authority over the peninsula.
But the Crimean Tatar community is an important domestic factor for Turkey. According to various estimates, approximately 4–5 million descendants of Crimean Tatars live in the country. Russian expert in Turkic languages and civilization Pavel Shlykov has noted that, “there are forces in Turkey that are ready to exploit the romantic moods of a part of the Turkish elite who dream of expanding more actively into the Caucasus, Crimea, the Volga Region and Central Asia, and who view Russia not as a partner, but as a geopolitical rival.” In this regard, it is no coincidence that Erdogan, justifying his initiative to act as a mediator between Moscow and Kiev, has pointed out just how important it is for the Black Sea region as a whole to see a positive resolution to the Crimean Tatar issue. During his visit to Ukraine in February, Erdogan met with a delegation from the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (an organization banned in the Russian Federation).
But Turkey does not focus on Crimea only. The Turkish elite, realizing the complexity of relations between Moscow and Kiev, uses Ukrainian channels to express its dissatisfaction with Russian stance on other foreign policy issues. This was the case during Erdogan’s visit to Kiev on February 3, 2020, which was timed to coincide with the 28th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Turkey and post-Soviet Ukraine. It also took place against the backdrop of a sharp military escalation in Syria. The Turkish President lambasted the Russian leadership for deliberately turning a blind eye to the actions of the “Syrian regime.”
We should keep in mind that contacts with Bartholomew I of Constantinople are extremely important for the Ukrainian leader, Volodymyr Zelensky (as they were for his predecessor Petro Poroshenko), as he wants to use the Archbishop’s influence to fuel the “nationalization” of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. And there are no two ways about it—he needs Erdogan to do this. Arguably, Ukraine is willing to showcase its privileged relations with Azerbaijan, while it also seems poised to affirm the policy of non-recognition towards the genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Following the Second Karabakh War, Kiev has noted a change in the behaviour of the Azerbaijani leadership, deeming it more relevant to today than the example of the 1995 “pacification” of the Republic of Serbian Krajina it relied on before.
However, despite the commonality of interests and growing cooperation between the sides, Ankara will most likely try to compensate for its emotions with regard to Ukraine by being pragmatic in its relations with Russia. No matter how intensively cooperation between Ankara and Kiev may develop, Erdogan is not trying to give up its role as an “intermediary” between Ukraine and Russia. He is under no illusion that the West would be satisfied if it were Turkey pulling the chestnuts out of the fire and not the “Euro-Atlantic brotherhood.” But the Turkish leadership is trying to raise its profile in the dialogue with the United States and the European Union by appealing to its “special relations” with Moscow. For all intents and purposes, this looks similar to how Ankara is conducting the dialogue with the European Union around the problem of refugees and migrants from the Middle East. For Turkey, getting caught up in an open confrontation with Russia would mean losing its status as a “special member” of NATO that needs to be coaxed and coddled.
Over recent years, Erdogan has thrown down the gauntlet to a number of countries, such as when putting Moscow, Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi, among others, on notice. However, by embracing his image as a major troublemaker, the President of Turkey has repeatedly shown that he is able to rationalize confrontation. This was the case in 2016 when Turkey and Russia disagreed over Syria, and in 2021 when Joe Biden called the tragedy of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire a genocide.
However, no matter how the Turkish President and his inner circle maneuver, Turkey is becoming more and more militarily and politically involved in post-Soviet affairs with each passing day. And we are no longer talking exclusively about the Caucasus region. It appears as if Erdogan wants to become one of the key actors in the Ukrainian game—a player without whom any reconfiguration in the Black Sea region would be, if not impossible, then extremely unlikely.
Discover more from The Monitor
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Analysis
Remembering Eliana Moreno: The Legacy of NBC LA’s “Eli in the Heli”
Key Takeaways
- Eliana Moreno, longtime aerial reporter for NBC4 Los Angeles and Telemundo 52, died September 15, 2026, in a helicopter crash in Chatsworth, Los Angeles, while covering a traffic collision.
- Her pilot, veteran aviator George Marciniw, and a third person on the ground also died in the crash.
- Moreno had covered Southern California from the air since September 2010, becoming known to viewers and followers as “Eli in the Heli.”
- She graduated from Chapman University in 2010 with degrees in broadcast journalism and political science, and had said she knew she wanted to be a TV journalist since age 11.
- She was engaged to Robert Barrientos, having announced their engagement in October 2025, and is remembered by colleagues as a source of steadiness during breaking news coverage.
- The crash remains under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board.
A Career Built in the Air
Eliana Moreno spent 16 years reporting Southern California’s biggest breaking news stories from above — traffic collisions, wildfires, police pursuits, and everything in between — for NBC4 Los Angeles and its sister station, Telemundo 52. She worked for Angel City Air Inc., the company that operates News Chopper 4, from September 2010 until her death.
Colleagues at Telemundo described her as, in their words, “the best airborne reporter in all of Los Angeles,” praising both her professionalism and her role as a calming, dependable presence in the newsroom during chaotic live coverage.
Moreno had wanted to be a television journalist since she was 11 years old. Rather than starting in a smaller regional market, as is common in local news, she moved directly into the Los Angeles market immediately after graduating from Chapman University in 2010 with dual degrees in broadcast journalism and political science. Before that, she anchored and reported in both English and Spanish for outlets in Orange County, where she was born and raised.
“Eli in the Heli”
Moreno’s Instagram handle, “Eli in the Heli,” became something of a personal brand among Southern California viewers who followed her aerial coverage and off-duty posts — sunsets over the city, long shifts during breaking news, and glimpses of life alongside her flight crew. In 2023, after working 76 hours over the course of several days covering a story, she wrote that she couldn’t complain because she had “the best job in the world.”
She and pilot George Marciniw began flying together in 2023 and developed a close working partnership, often crediting each other in the images and footage they shared publicly. Marciniw, who had more than 30 years of flight experience and graduated from Burbank High School in 1974, frequently attributed the photos on his own social accounts to “his companion and colleague, Moreno.”
Personal Life
Moreno announced her engagement to Robert Barrientos on October 28, 2025. She was also a mother. Friends and followers have described her as someone who balanced the demands of a physically and mentally grueling job — she guest-spoke at local high schools and colleges to aspiring journalists in her time off — with a full life outside the newsroom.
The Crash
The helicopter crashed the evening of September 15, 2026, between two buildings in Chatsworth while the crew was providing live coverage of a fatal collision between a bus and an SUV just blocks away. Three people died, including a person on the ground. The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating; no official cause has been determined at this time.
A Community in Mourning
Tributes poured in from colleagues, viewers, and fellow journalists across Southern California within hours of the confirmation. NBC Los Angeles and Telemundo 52 both issued statements honoring Moreno’s professionalism and her years documenting the region’s biggest stories from above.
Who was Eliana Moreno?
Eliana Moreno was an aerial reporter for NBC4 Los Angeles and Telemundo 52, known as “Eli in the Heli,” who covered Southern California breaking news from a news helicopter for 16 years. She died on September 15, 2026, alongside pilot George Marciniw in a helicopter crash in Chatsworth, Los Angeles.
Discover more from The Monitor
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Analysis
Rep. Thomas Massie’s Impeachment Push Against Pete Hegseth, Explained
Key Takeaways
- On September 15, 2026, Republican Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) introduced a 34-page, eight-article resolution to impeach Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, centered on the ongoing U.S. war in Iran.
- Massie’s resolution is privileged, meaning it forces a House floor vote within two legislative days regardless of leadership’s wishes.
- Massie gave GOP leadership no advance notice — an intraparty break that deepens his rift with President Trump and House leadership.
- The Pentagon called the impeachment push baseless, with press secretary Kingsley Wilson defending Hegseth as a “transformative leader.”
- A separate, six-article impeachment push against Hegseth was already introduced by House Democrats in April 2026 — meaning Hegseth now faces impeachment efforts from both parties, though both are considered near-certain to fail in a GOP-controlled House.
What Massie’s Resolution Actually Alleges
The eight articles of impeachment accuse Hegseth of:
- Violating the War Powers Resolution of 1973 by continuing U.S. military action in Iran after Congress passed resolutions in June and July directing troop withdrawal.
- Failing to minimize civilian casualties, citing a strike on a school in Minab that Iranian officials say killed more than 100 children.
- Directing the operation that captured former Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro without congressional authorization.
- Broader military actions in Venezuela and Yemen conducted, Massie argues, outside constitutional and statutory limits.
Massie told reporters the push was about placing “a marker in history,” not about realistic prospects of success: “Doing this wasn’t predicated on whether it could succeed or not.”
Why Massie Moved Now
Massie said the timing was deliberate — Speaker Mike Johnson had effectively wound down the legislative calendar ahead of the midterms, leaving the privileged resolution as his last mechanism to force a recorded vote on the war before recess.
The Political Backdrop
The Congressional Budget Office estimated the Iran conflict has cost $38 billion to date and contributed to inflation rising from 2.3% to 5.3% in the second quarter of 2026 — a figure directly tied to the oil-price dynamics covered in our companion piece on the Dow’s reaction to Middle East tensions.
Notably, Massie’s move came the same day House Democrats were separately pursuing a symbolic impeachment vote against President Trump himself, creating a rare moment where both parties had impeachment measures moving through the chamber simultaneously.
What Happens Next
Because the resolution is privileged, House leadership has two options: allow a floor vote on impeachment itself, or move to table (kill) the resolution — the more likely outcome given GOP control of the chamber. Either path forces individual Republicans onto the record regarding the administration’s Iran war conduct heading into the midterms.
Did the House vote to impeach Pete Hegseth?
As of September 15, 2026, Rep. Thomas Massie forced the impeachment resolution to the floor using a privileged motion, requiring a House vote within two legislative days. The resolution is widely viewed as almost certain to fail or be tabled given Republican control of the House.
Discover more from The Monitor
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
News
Bloodhound Q50: Remembering the Tragic Loss of Chicago’s Rising Drill Star
Key Takeaways
- Chicago drill artist Bloodhound Q50, born Mikquale Cooper, was fatally shot in the early hours of Sunday, September 13, 2026, in the city’s Fuller Park neighborhood. He was 22.
- Police say two vehicles pulled alongside Cooper’s car at a gas station and gunmen opened fire, striking him in the chest and shoulder before fleeing the scene; no arrests have been made.
- The Cook County Medical Examiner’s office has formally identified the victim as Mikquale Cooper of Chicago; a manager with AMF Music Group confirmed Cooper performed as Bloodhound Q50.
- Q50 had just released his project Get Back or Die Trying and performed at Rolling Loud Orlando earlier this year.
- His death adds to a painful pattern within Chicago’s drill scene — Q50 was a member of the Bloodhounds collective alongside his cousin, Bloodhound Lil Jeff, who was killed in a separate shooting in 2024.
Chicago’s drill music community is mourning the loss of Mikquale Cooper, the 22-year-old rising artist known to fans as Bloodhound Q50, who was shot and killed early Sunday morning in the city’s Fuller Park neighborhood. The killing has drawn tributes from across the hip-hop world and reignited difficult conversations about violence within the genre’s Chicago roots.
What Happened
According to the Chicago Police Department, Cooper was seated in the driver’s seat of his car at a gas station in the 4200 block of South Wentworth Avenue at approximately 3:58 a.m. on Sunday, September 13, when two vehicles pulled up alongside him. Gunmen from both cars opened fire, striking Cooper in the chest and shoulder. Chicago Fire Department personnel treated him at the scene, where he was pronounced dead. The vehicles involved — described as a black Acura sedan and a silver Honda Accord — fled onto the southbound Dan Ryan Expressway. As of this writing, no arrests have been made, and police have said the investigation remains ongoing.
The Cook County Medical Examiner’s office has officially identified the victim as Mikquale Cooper of Chicago. While Chicago police did not publicly name the victim in their initial statements, a manager with AMF Music Group — the label associated with Cooper — confirmed to multiple outlets that he was the artist known as Bloodhound Q50.
Who Was Bloodhound Q50
Cooper emerged from Chicago’s drill scene as part of the Bloodhounds collective, performing alongside artists including his cousin, Bloodhound Lil Jeff, who was himself killed in a shooting in 2024. Q50 built a following with tracks including “Don’t Blink or Stare” and “Splash Bros 2,” and had recently celebrated his 22nd birthday on August 6 with the release of his project Get Back or Die Trying. He had performed at the Rolling Loud festival in Orlando earlier this year, a milestone that reflected his growing profile beyond Chicago’s local scene.
Following news of his death, Rolling Loud posted condolences online, and members of the broader hip-hop community, including commentator DJ Vlad, shared memories of their interactions with the artist. Cooper’s mother also addressed the public directly in the hours after his death, responding to unkind commentary online with a defense of her son’s memory.
A Painful, Recurring Pattern
Q50’s death has renewed attention on the toll gun violence has taken on Chicago’s drill music community specifically, and on young Black artists and residents more broadly. His cousin and collaborator Bloodhound Lil Jeff was killed in 2024, meaning the Bloodhounds collective has now lost two members to gun violence within roughly two years. Commentators and advocates who work on violence prevention in Chicago have pointed to the case as part of a broader, well-documented cycle in which drill artists — who often narrate the violence of their neighborhoods in their music — become victims of that same violence themselves.
Why This Story Resonates Beyond Chicago
Drill music, which originated in Chicago in the early 2010s before spreading to London, New York, and beyond, has long faced scrutiny over its relationship to real-world violence — both as a chronicle of conditions artists live through and, critics argue, as a potential accelerant of street conflicts. Q50’s death arrives as that debate continues, offering no easy resolution but underscoring the very real human cost behind the genre’s most difficult subject matter. For fans, his passing is a reminder of how quickly a promising career — an artist just months removed from a Rolling Loud stage — can be cut short.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who was Bloodhound Q50?
Bloodhound Q50, born Mikquale Cooper, was a 22-year-old Chicago drill rapper and member of the Bloodhounds collective, known for tracks like “Don’t Blink or Stare” and his recent project Get Back or Die Trying.
How did Bloodhound Q50 die?
He was fatally shot early Sunday, September 13, 2026, in Chicago’s Fuller Park neighborhood when gunmen in two vehicles pulled alongside his car and opened fire. He was struck in the chest and shoulder and pronounced dead at the scene.
Have there been any arrests in the Bloodhound Q50 shooting?
As of this writing, no arrests have been made. Chicago police have said the investigation is ongoing and have asked anyone with information to come forward.
Discover more from The Monitor
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
-
Featured5 years agoThe Right-Wing Politics in United States & The Capitol Hill Mayhem
-
News5 years agoPrioritizing health & education most effective way to improve socio-economic status: President
-
China5 years agoCoronavirus Pandemic and Global Response
-
Canada5 years agoSocio-Economic Implications of Canadian Border Closure With U.S
-
Democracy5 years agoMissing You! SPSC
-
Conflict5 years agoKashmir Lockdown, UNGA & Thereafter
-
Democracy5 years agoPresident Dr Arif Alvi Confers Civil Awards on Independence Day
-
Digital6 years agoPakistan Moves Closer to Train One Million Youth with Digital Skills
